Files
linux/fs/verity/open.c
Andrey Albershteyn 07d09774e2 fsverity: generate and store zero-block hash
Compute the hash of one filesystem block's worth of zeros. A filesystem
implementation can decide to elide merkle tree blocks containing only
this hash and synthesize the contents at read time.

Let's pretend that there's a file containing 131 data block and whose
merkle tree looks roughly like this:

root
 +--leaf0
 |   +--data0
 |   +--data1
 |   +--...
 |   `--data128
 `--leaf1
     +--data129
     +--data130
     `--data131

If data[0-128] are sparse holes, then leaf0 will contain a repeating
sequence of @zero_digest.  Therefore, leaf0 need not be written to disk
because its contents can be synthesized.

A subsequent xfs patch will use this to reduce the size of the merkle
tree when dealing with sparse gold master disk images and the like.

Note that this works only on the first-level (data holes). fsverity
doesn't store/generate zero_digest for any higher levels.

Add a helper to pre-fill folio with hashes of empty blocks. This will be
used by iomap to synthesize blocks full of zero hashes on the fly.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260520123722.405752-5-aalbersh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-06-05 13:36:22 +02:00

426 lines
12 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Opening fs-verity files
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep;
static struct rhashtable fsverity_info_hash;
static const struct rhashtable_params fsverity_info_hash_params = {
.key_len = sizeof_field(struct fsverity_info, inode),
.key_offset = offsetof(struct fsverity_info, inode),
.head_offset = offsetof(struct fsverity_info, rhash_head),
.automatic_shrinking = true,
};
/**
* fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params() - initialize Merkle tree parameters
* @params: the parameters struct to initialize
* @inode: the inode for which the Merkle tree is being built
* @hash_algorithm: number of hash algorithm to use
* @log_blocksize: log base 2 of block size to use
* @salt: pointer to salt (optional)
* @salt_size: size of salt, possibly 0
*
* Validate the hash algorithm and block size, then compute the tree topology
* (num levels, num blocks in each level, etc.) and initialize @params.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int hash_algorithm,
unsigned int log_blocksize,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size)
{
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
int err;
u64 blocks;
u64 blocks_in_level[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
u64 offset;
int level;
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
hash_alg = fsverity_get_hash_alg(inode, hash_algorithm);
if (!hash_alg)
return -EINVAL;
params->hash_alg = hash_alg;
params->digest_size = hash_alg->digest_size;
if (salt_size) {
params->hashstate =
fsverity_prepare_hash_state(hash_alg, salt, salt_size);
if (!params->hashstate) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
}
/*
* fs/verity/ directly assumes that the Merkle tree block size is a
* power of 2 less than or equal to PAGE_SIZE. Another restriction
* arises from the interaction between fs/verity/ and the filesystems
* themselves: filesystems expect to be able to verify a single
* filesystem block of data at a time. Therefore, the Merkle tree block
* size must also be less than or equal to the filesystem block size.
*
* The above are the only hard limitations, so in theory the Merkle tree
* block size could be as small as twice the digest size. However,
* that's not useful, and it would result in some unusually deep and
* large Merkle trees. So we currently require that the Merkle tree
* block size be at least 1024 bytes. That's small enough to test the
* sub-page block case on systems with 4K pages, but not too small.
*/
if (log_blocksize < 10 || log_blocksize > PAGE_SHIFT ||
log_blocksize > inode->i_blkbits) {
fsverity_warn(inode, "Unsupported log_blocksize: %u",
log_blocksize);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
params->log_blocksize = log_blocksize;
params->block_size = 1 << log_blocksize;
params->log_blocks_per_page = PAGE_SHIFT - log_blocksize;
params->blocks_per_page = 1 << params->log_blocks_per_page;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_power_of_2(params->digest_size))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
if (params->block_size < 2 * params->digest_size) {
fsverity_warn(inode,
"Merkle tree block size (%u) too small for hash algorithm \"%s\"",
params->block_size, hash_alg->name);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
params->log_digestsize = ilog2(params->digest_size);
params->log_arity = log_blocksize - params->log_digestsize;
params->hashes_per_block = 1 << params->log_arity;
/*
* Compute the number of levels in the Merkle tree and create a map from
* level to the starting block of that level. Level 'num_levels - 1' is
* the root and is stored first. Level 0 is the level directly "above"
* the data blocks and is stored last.
*/
/* Compute number of levels and the number of blocks in each level */
blocks = ((u64)inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >> log_blocksize;
while (blocks > 1) {
if (params->num_levels >= FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Too many levels in Merkle tree");
err = -EFBIG;
goto out_err;
}
blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
params->log_arity;
blocks_in_level[params->num_levels++] = blocks;
}
/* Compute the starting block of each level */
offset = 0;
for (level = (int)params->num_levels - 1; level >= 0; level--) {
params->level_start[level] = offset;
offset += blocks_in_level[level];
}
/*
* With block_size != PAGE_SIZE, an in-memory bitmap will need to be
* allocated to track the "verified" status of hash blocks. Don't allow
* this bitmap to get too large. For now, limit it to 1 MiB, which
* limits the file size to about 4.4 TB with SHA-256 and 4K blocks.
*
* Together with the fact that the data, and thus also the Merkle tree,
* cannot have more than ULONG_MAX pages, this implies that hash block
* indices can always fit in an 'unsigned long'. But to be safe, we
* explicitly check for that too. Note, this is only for hash block
* indices; data block indices might not fit in an 'unsigned long'.
*/
if ((params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE && offset > 1 << 23) ||
offset > ULONG_MAX) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Too many blocks in Merkle tree");
err = -EFBIG;
goto out_err;
}
fsverity_hash_block(params, page_address(ZERO_PAGE(0)),
params->zero_digest);
params->tree_size = offset << log_blocksize;
params->tree_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(params->tree_size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
return 0;
out_err:
kfree(params->hashstate);
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
return err;
}
/*
* Compute the file digest by hashing the fsverity_descriptor excluding the
* builtin signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
*/
static void compute_file_digest(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
u8 *file_digest)
{
__le32 sig_size = desc->sig_size;
desc->sig_size = 0;
fsverity_hash_buffer(hash_alg, desc, sizeof(*desc), file_digest);
desc->sig_size = sig_size;
}
/*
* Create a new fsverity_info from the given fsverity_descriptor (with optional
* appended builtin signature), and check the signature if present. The
* fsverity_descriptor must have already undergone basic validation.
*/
struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(struct inode *inode,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc)
{
struct fsverity_info *vi;
int err;
vi = kmem_cache_zalloc(fsverity_info_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vi)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
vi->inode = inode;
err = fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(&vi->tree_params, inode,
desc->hash_algorithm,
desc->log_blocksize,
desc->salt, desc->salt_size);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d initializing Merkle tree parameters",
err);
goto fail;
}
memcpy(vi->root_hash, desc->root_hash, vi->tree_params.digest_size);
compute_file_digest(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, desc, vi->file_digest);
err = fsverity_verify_signature(vi, desc->signature,
le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size));
if (err)
goto fail;
if (vi->tree_params.block_size != PAGE_SIZE) {
/*
* When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use
* a bitmap to keep track of which hash blocks have been
* verified. This bitmap must contain one bit per hash block,
* including alignment to a page boundary at the end.
*
* Eventually, to support extremely large files in an efficient
* way, it might be necessary to make pages of this bitmap
* reclaimable. But for now, simply allocating the whole bitmap
* is a simple solution that works well on the files on which
* fsverity is realistically used. E.g., with SHA-256 and 4K
* blocks, a 100MB file only needs a 24-byte bitmap, and the
* bitmap for any file under 17GB fits in a 4K page.
*/
unsigned long num_bits =
vi->tree_params.tree_pages <<
vi->tree_params.log_blocks_per_page;
vi->hash_block_verified = kvcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(num_bits),
sizeof(unsigned long),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vi->hash_block_verified) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
}
return vi;
fail:
fsverity_free_info(vi);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
int fsverity_set_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)
{
return rhashtable_lookup_insert_fast(&fsverity_info_hash,
&vi->rhash_head,
fsverity_info_hash_params);
}
struct fsverity_info *__fsverity_get_info(const struct inode *inode)
{
return rhashtable_lookup_fast(&fsverity_info_hash, &inode,
fsverity_info_hash_params);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_get_info);
static bool validate_fsverity_descriptor(struct inode *inode,
const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
size_t desc_size)
{
if (desc_size < sizeof(*desc)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Unrecognized descriptor size: %zu bytes",
desc_size);
return false;
}
if (desc->version != 1) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Unrecognized descriptor version: %u",
desc->version);
return false;
}
if (memchr_inv(desc->__reserved, 0, sizeof(desc->__reserved))) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Reserved bits set in descriptor");
return false;
}
if (desc->salt_size > sizeof(desc->salt)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Invalid salt_size: %u", desc->salt_size);
return false;
}
if (le64_to_cpu(desc->data_size) != inode->i_size) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Wrong data_size: %llu (desc) != %lld (inode)",
le64_to_cpu(desc->data_size), inode->i_size);
return false;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size) > desc_size - sizeof(*desc)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Signature overflows verity descriptor");
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Read the inode's fsverity_descriptor (with optional appended builtin
* signature) from the filesystem, and do basic validation of it.
*/
int fsverity_get_descriptor(struct inode *inode,
struct fsverity_descriptor **desc_ret)
{
int res;
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc;
res = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_verity_descriptor(inode, NULL, 0);
if (res < 0) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d getting verity descriptor size", res);
return res;
}
if (res > FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Verity descriptor is too large (%d bytes)",
res);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
desc = kmalloc(res, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
return -ENOMEM;
res = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_verity_descriptor(inode, desc, res);
if (res < 0) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d reading verity descriptor", res);
kfree(desc);
return res;
}
if (!validate_fsverity_descriptor(inode, desc, res)) {
kfree(desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
*desc_ret = desc;
return 0;
}
static int ensure_verity_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fsverity_info *vi = fsverity_get_info(inode), *found;
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc;
int err;
if (vi)
return 0;
err = fsverity_get_descriptor(inode, &desc);
if (err)
return err;
vi = fsverity_create_info(inode, desc);
if (IS_ERR(vi)) {
err = PTR_ERR(vi);
goto out_free_desc;
}
/*
* Multiple tasks may race to set the inode's verity info, in which case
* we might find an existing fsverity_info in the hash table.
*/
found = rhashtable_lookup_get_insert_fast(&fsverity_info_hash,
&vi->rhash_head,
fsverity_info_hash_params);
if (found) {
fsverity_free_info(vi);
if (IS_ERR(found))
err = PTR_ERR(found);
}
out_free_desc:
kfree(desc);
return err;
}
int __fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
return -EPERM;
return ensure_verity_info(inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_file_open);
void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)
{
kfree(vi->tree_params.hashstate);
kvfree(vi->hash_block_verified);
kmem_cache_free(fsverity_info_cachep, vi);
}
void fsverity_remove_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)
{
rhashtable_remove_fast(&fsverity_info_hash, &vi->rhash_head,
fsverity_info_hash_params);
fsverity_free_info(vi);
}
void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fsverity_info *vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
if (vi)
fsverity_remove_info(vi);
}
void __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void)
{
if (rhashtable_init(&fsverity_info_hash, &fsverity_info_hash_params))
panic("failed to initialize fsverity hash\n");
fsverity_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE_USERCOPY(
fsverity_info,
SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT | SLAB_PANIC,
file_digest);
}